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THE CHOICE TO LIMIT CHOICE: USING PSYCHIATRIC
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES TO MANAGE THE EFFECTS OF
MENTAL ILLNESS AND SUPPORT SELF-RESPONSIBILITY
Breanne M. Sheetz*
Psychiatric advance directives are a valuable tool for individuals with mental ill-
nesses. Ulysses directives, in particular, allow individuals to bind themselves to
treatment in advance of needing it for the purpose of overcoming illness-induced
refusals. This Note evaluates the effectiveness of state advance directive statutes in
three areas that are especially important for Ulysses directives: defining competency
to execute, activate, and revoke directives; waiving the constitutional right to re-
fuse treatment; and encouraging provider compliance. This Note ultimately
advocates for other states to adopt provisions similar to a Washington State stat-
ute. The Washington statute authorizes Ulysses directives by allowing advance
consent to treatment, establishing a mechanism for overriding refusals, and per-
mitting irrevocability, but it also provides flexibility so that individuals can craft a
personalized plan for their needs.
INTRODUCTION: JANE'S STORY'
Doctors diagnosed Jane's bipolar disorder after a severe manic
episode that lasted for several months. She first experienced racing
thoughts and excessive energy. Family and friends struggled to un-
derstand her because she spoke rapidly with disjointed thoughts.
Jane began having delusions about herself and others, believing
that she was a reincarnated savior and perceiving extreme good or
evil in strangers. Her family tried to admit her to a psychiatric hos-
pital, but the staff could not keep her because she refused to
accept treatment and she was not technically a danger to herself or
others. Through it all, Jane believed that nothing was wrong. In-
stead, she was exuberant about life and thought that she had
discovered the secret of happiness.
As the illness progressed, Jane cut off all contact with family and
friends because they could not appreciate her newfound happi-
ness. She befriended a family of criminals, allowing them to stay in
* University of Michigan Law School,J.D. expected 2007; University of Puget Sound,
B.A. 2001. 1 would like to thank Mark Cody, whose course in Disability Law helped to de-
velop this Note, and Carl Schneider and Beth Wilensky for helping me cultivate my legal
writing skills. I would also like to thank my family and friends, whose support made this Note
possible.
1. References to Jane's story throughout this Note are based on the experiences of an
actual person known to the author.
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her apartment and buying them expensive presents. She stopped
going to class and to work. Jane rarely slept or ate. Eventually,
when she ran out of money, she became homeless and wandered
all over the city, starting conservations with anyone who would lis-
ten, and getting into trouble with the police. After devastating
nearly every aspect of her life, Jane's delusions started crashing
down around her. She was alone with no money and no support.
Her family agreed to help her if she sought treatment, as they had
maintained all along, and Jane finally admitted herself to an inpa-
tient treatment program.
After recovering from the episode, declaring bankruptcy, re-
building relationships with family and friends, finishing college,
and returning to work, Jane decided that she never again wanted
the illness to control her life. Unfortunately, she knew it was likely
that, if she became manic again, she would experience the same
loss of judgment and insight that had prevented her from seeing
the truth about her condition the first time. Jane strictly adhered
to her treatment plan, taking her medication and visiting her psy-
chiatrist regularly. However, she still had a nagging fear that it
would happen again. To allay her concern, she executed a psychi-
atric advance directive, a legal document that enabled her to plan
her mental health treatment in advance. In Jane's case, she gave
prospective consent to hospitalization and medication for future
manic episodes.
This Note addresses why and how psychiatric advance directives
should be enforced when an individual with a mental illness, like
Jane, requests hospitalization or other treatment in advance of
needing it. Such a request is generally made because the individual
foresees that she will refuse treatment during an acute episode.
Some mental illnesses, such as bipolar disorder, cause the affected
individuals to deny that they have an illness when they feel the ef-
fects most keenly. This lack of insight is a symptom of the illness,
and the individual may wish to minimize the negative conse-
quences by prescribing treatment in advance.
The first Part of this Note will briefly discuss why a person with a
mental illness should be able to prescribe future treatment. The
Note will examine arguments for this proposition, such as the
benefits of early intervention and improved decision-making, as
well as counter-arguments, which include the potential for abuse.
This Note will then analyze the major barriers to enforcing psychi-
atric advance directives that prospectively request treatment. These
challenges include competency assessments for individuals whose
decision-making capacity varies over time and constitutional limita-
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tions such as the right to refuse treatment. The majority of this
Note will evaluate how effectively psychiatric advance directive
statutes address the needs of individuals like Jane. This Note ulti-
mately advocates for other states to adopt provisions similar to a
Washington State statute, which permits advance consent to treat-
ment, authorizes irrevocable directives, and establishes a
mechanism for overriding illness-induced refusals of treatment,
while also providing flexibility so that individuals can craft a per-
sonalized plan for their needs.
I. THE VALUE OF PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
Psychiatric advance directives are legal documents that enable
individuals to plan in advance for mental health treatment. The
directives can take several forms. One type, the instructional direc-
tive, allows individuals to provide directions about treatments that
they would or would not like to receive while they are incapable of
2making treatment decisions. A second type, the proxy directive,
permits individuals to appoint an agent to make decisions for them
while they are incapacitated. Another type, the hybrid directive,
contains elements of both instructional and proxy directives.4 A
fourth type, the Ulysses directive, is most pertinent to individuals
with episodic and insight-impairing illnesses like Jane's because it
enables them prospectively to bind themselves to treatment and
override, in advance, their refusals during acute episodes of their
illnesses.5 The name references The Odyssey, in which Ulysses, be-
fore sailing into the domain of the Sirens, directed his men to tie
him to the mast of his ship so that he could listen to their irresisti-
ble song without throwing himself overboard, and commanded
them to bind him more tightly if he demanded to be unbound.
Analogously, Jane executes an irrevocable advance directive to en-
sure that she will receive treatment because she predicts that she
2. John Q. La Fond & Debra Srebnik, The Impact of Mental Health Advance Directives on
Patient Perceptions of Coercion in Civil Commitment and Treatment Decisions, 25 INT'LJ.L. & PSY-
CHIATRY 537, 540 (2002).
3. Id. at 541.
4. Id.
5. Ryan Spellecy, Reviving Ulysses Contracts, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 373, 374-75
(2003).
6. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, Book XII, lines 177-83, reprinted in 3 GREAT BOOKS OF THE
WESTERN WORLD: THE ILIAD AND THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 422 (Mortimer J. Adler ed.,
Richmond Lattimore trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1990).
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will irrationally ask to be "untied" from her previously expressed
wishes when she is manic.
A. More Effective Treatment
Fundamentally, psychiatric advance directives are valuable be-
cause they enable individuals with mental illnesses to obtain
treatment that helps them manage their illnesses. Many individuals
with mental illnesses can lead productive and satisfying lives, and
their opportunity to do so increases with consistent treatment.7 Al-
though psychiatric treatment does not cure chronic mental illness,
it has the potential to "return an individual to a higher level of
competency and social functioning."8 Individuals with mental ill-
nesses often benefit from treatment. For example, in a review of
thirty-eight studies of retrospective satisfaction with hospitalization,
a researcher found that a majority of patients in thirty of the stud-
ies voiced favorable attitudes and claimed that treatment had
helped them. 9 Furthermore, early treatment can be crucial for
minimizing the negative effects of an acute episode of mental ill-
ness. 10 If Jane had been able to obtain earlier intervention during
her first manic episode, then it likely would have halted the down-
ward spiral that led to her bankruptcy, her damaged relationships,
and her productivity and reputational losses at school and work. A
Ulysses directive will enable her to receive beneficial early treat-
ment and avoid these consequences in the future, even if another
episode of mania causes her to refuse it at the time.
B. Better Decision-Making
Individuals with mental illnesses are in a better position to make
reasoned decisions about their treatment when they are not acutely
affected by symptoms of their illnesses. As one scholar explained
the argument, "there is a 'true' or 'rational' identity best equipped
to make long-term decisions for that person.... The [advance di-
rective] state would enforce the choices of this identity and
7. Robert D. Miller, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Treatment: A View from the Trenches, 4
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 728, 731 (1998).
8. Elizabeth M. Gallagher, Advance Directives for Psychiatric Care: A Theoretical and Practi-
cal Overviewfor Legal Professionals, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 746, 769 (1998).
9. Raymond Weinstein, Patient Attitudes Toward Mental Hospitalization: A Review of
Quantitative Research, 20J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 237, 247-48, 251 (1979).
10. See Roberto Cuca, Ulysses in Minnesota: First Steps Toward a Self-Binding Psychiatric Ad-
vance Directive Statute, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 1152, 1163 (1993).
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disregard subsequent choices of the 'mentally ill' identity."" For
example, an individual with bipolar disorder, like Jane, might wish
to prevent her manic self from making decisions regarding mental
health treatment that would negatively impact the education, ca-
reer, finances, and family relationships she values while she is
well. 12
Mental illness is unique because affected individuals must learn
to accommodate a "rational" self and a "mentally ill" self. Individu-
als with mental illnesses are often capable of making rational
decisions, but the episodic nature of their illnesses means that
their decision-making capacity will sometimes be impaired. 13 As
one scholar explained, "acute episodes of mental illness are ...
frequently characterized by a loss of competent decision-making
ability." 4 Thus, when an episode occurs, individuals with mental
illnesses may no longer be able to make well-reasoned decisions
about their treatment. Indeed, the legal system recognizes that an
individual's decision-making capacity can vary over time, particu-
larly for those who suffer from "alternating periods of competence
and incompetence" due to mental illness. 5 Advance directives offer
one solution to this problem and a mechanism for averting the
"devastating losses" of the type Jane experienced. 6 With an ad-
vance directive, Jane's "rational self' can choose to obtain prompt
intervention and override the refusals of her "mentally ill self."
However, some critics of advance directives argue that they rep-
resent a form of paternalism by privileging an individual's
decisions at one point in time over her later decisions. In other
words, the "present self' is permitted to "waive rights that the 'fu-
ture self would otherwise possess."'7 Accordingly, these critics
maintain that the reasoning behind Ulysses directives does not
11. Rebecca S. Dresser, Ulysses and the Psychiatrists: A Legal and Policy Analysis of the Vol-
untaty Commitment Contract, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 777, 785 n.31 (1982) (criticizing
Ulysses directives).
12. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 780.
13. Bruce J. Winick, Advance Directive Instruments for Those with Mental Illness, 51 U. Mi-
AMI L. REv. 57, 58, 67 (1996).
14. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 747.
15. Id. at 746. In a number of states, psychiatric advance directive statutes supply a
definition of incompetence or incapacity and a method for determining whether an indi-
vidual satisfies the criteria. See infra Part II1.B.1.
16. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 780 (describing the "devastating losses that frequently
accompany the declining judgment and uncontrolled impulsivity characteristic of the early
stages of [mania].").
17. Dresser, supranote 11, at 819.
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withstand scrutiny." Yet, advance directives often promote an indi-
vidual's rational treatment choices.'9 If Jane could not execute a
Ulysses directive and the symptoms of her illness returned, she
would be unable to obtain the help she prospectively wanted when
she was well. As a result, she would likely re-experience the same
kinds of losses that she actively sought to prevent. While advance
directives limit the choices of an individual's "mentally ill self," they
carry out the wishes of her "rational self." A person's reasoned de-
cision to commit herself to treatment, and thereby avoid the
potentially devastating consequences of her illness, should be re-
spected.
C. Greater Self-Responsibility
Executing an advance directive provides therapeutic benefits
and promotes self-responsibility. One scholar identified numerous
benefits of advance directives, including: (1) helping individuals
with mental illnesses identify and implement preventative meas-
ures, (2) persuading them to seek out early treatment, (3) avoiding
recurrence by encouraging individuals to take responsibility for
treatment decisions, (4) assisting them in setting goals and working
toward achieving them, (5) assuring individuals that their choices
will be respected to ease worry and stress, and (6) increasing col-
laboration between mental health consumers and providers.
These benefits relate to the larger themes of patient empowerment
and self-responsibility. Advance directives allow individuals to "re-
tain the maximum degree of control possible over their lives and
over their medical care, even in the face of the most severe and
disabling episodes of illness.'2 By executing advance directives,
individuals with mental illnesses assert control over their lives and
take responsibility for their futures.
Nevertheless, some critics argue that psychiatric advance direc-
tives enable coercion of individuals with mental illnesses by various
actors, including healthcare providers, proxy decision-makers, and
18. See, e.g., id. at 787-92. See also Miller, supra note 7, at 730-32 (discussing different
views about patient decision-making).
19. Winick, supra note 13, at 81.
20. Id. at 81-84. See also BAZELON CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, POWER IN PLAN-
NING: SELF-DETERMINATION THROUGH PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE DIRECTIVES, § Consumers
and Providers Speak Out, at pp. 1-4 (2003) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) [hereinafter BAZELON CENTER], available at http://www.bazelon.org/
issues/advancedirectives/publications/powerinplanning/indexhtm (reporting qualitative
research on patient attitudes toward advance directives).
21. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 747.
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the state. Rather than encouraging individuals with mental ill-
nesses to make their own decisions, advance directives could be
used to force them to submit to treatments that they do not want.
However, the potential for abuse does not justify a categorical re-
jection of psychiatric advance directives. Instead, states should
strengthen the protections afforded to individuals who execute
21directives.
For example, Washington's statute includes several provisions to
prevent coercion. First, the legislature authorizes an individual
with an advance directive to "bring an action to contest the validity
of his or her directive."2' Therefore, if the directive were executed
under coercive conditions, the individual could free herself from
its control. Similarly, the statute provides that any person who has
reason to believe that "a directive has been created or revoked un-
der circumstances amounting to fraud, duress, or undue
influence" may petition the court to have the improper actions re-
viewed.25 Second, the statute requires capacity to be reevaluated at
regular intervals: if an individual is admitted to inpatient treatment
pursuant to the provisions of her directive, then the hospital must
reassess the individual's capacity within seventy-two hours and
whenever there is a change in the individual's condition.2N This
safeguard ensures that individuals will not be subjected to "coer-
cive" treatment for longer than they intended when executing
their directives. Third, the statute prohibits treatment facilities and
insurance companies from requiring that a directive be executed
as a condition for receiving services.27 As these provisions demon-
strate, a number of methods exist to discourage abuse and
coercion. Thus, individuals with mental illnesses can execute ad-
vance directives and still retain control over their treatment.
D. Stakeholder Support
Many stakeholders, who are intimately familiar with the effects
and treatment of mental illness, support advance directives. In
Washington, individuals with mental illnesses, particularly those
22. See, e.g., Dresser, supra note 11, at 781-86.
23. See Cuca, supra note 10, at 1185 (recognizing potential for coercion and recom-
mending solutions).
24. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.32.120 (2003).
25. Id. § 71.32.200.
26. Id. §§ 71.32.130(2) (a) (i)-(iii).
27. Id. § 71.32.220.
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with chronic and episodic illnesses like Jane's, pushed for legisla-
tion authorizing psychiatric advance directives. 2 Additionally,
service providers generally support psychiatric advance directives.29
In a survey of mental health service providers in two Washington
counties, over seventy-five percent of respondents "reported that
[psychiatric advance directives] would be useful for consumers and
treatment providers."' Considering the potential recognized by
the stakeholders in the mental health community-as well as the
possibility of promoting more effective treatment, better decision-
making, and increased self-responsibility-psychiatric advance di-
rectives are unmistakably valuable.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK SUPPORTING THE VALIDITY OF
PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
A. State Statutes
As a threshold matter, in order for psychiatric advance directives
to work in practice, the legal framework must support their use.
First, state legislatures must pass statutes that permit individuals to
execute advance directivesY.31 A majority of states have passed legis-
lation enabling advance directives for medical decision-making,
but advance directives in the mental health context have received
"relatively little attention" until recently: Between 1991 and 2006,
twenty-seven states enacted statutes authorizing psychiatric advance
directives in some form. These statutes will be examined later in
this Note.
28. Nick Anderson, Dr. Jekyll's Waiver of Mr. Hyde's Right to Refuse Medical Treatment:
Washington's New Law Authorizing Mental Health Care Advance Directives Needs Additional Protec-
tions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 795, 800 (2003) (citing correspondence from a legislative assistant).
29. Debra Srebnik & Lisa Brodoff, Implementing Psychiatric Advance Directives: Service Pro-
vider Issues and Answers, 30J. BEHAV. HEALTH SERVS. & RES. 253, 254 (2003).
30. Id.
31. Cuca, supra note 10, at 1153.
32. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 746.
33. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.52.010-.395 (1996) (authorizing "advance health care direc-
tives" and referring specifically to mental health treatment as one type of health care that
may be included in a directive); ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 36-3281 to -3287 (LexisNexis 1999)
(creating mechanism for "mental health care power of attorney"); D.C. CODE § 7-1231.06
(2001) (approving creation of "declaration of advance instructions for mental health treat-
ment"); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 327G-1 to -14 (2004) (enabling use of "advance mental health
care directive[s]"); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-601 to -613 (1998) (authorizing "[d]eclarations
for mental health treatment"); 755 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 43/1 to 43/85 (1995) (enacting the
"Mental Health Treatment Preference Declaration Act"); IND. CODE §§ 16-36-1.7-0.5 to -5
(2004) (creating mechanism for "psychiatric advance directive[s]"); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 202A.420-.432 (LexisNexis 2003) (approving creation of "advance directive for mental
[VOL. 40:2
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B. Supreme Court Caselaw
In addition to legislation, courts must be willing to enforce psy-
chiatric advance directives. Research has revealed no federal case
that directly addresses the enforceability of psychiatric advance di-
rectives, so the legal framework is still unsettled. 4 However, the
United States Supreme Court has implied that courts should con-
sider advance directives when making decisions about medical
care. In Cruzan v. Director Missouri Department of Health,35 the family
of Nancy Cruzan, who was in a persistent vegetative state, sought to
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment based on an earlier
conversation Ms. Cruzan had had with a friend in which she had
indicated that she would not want to live that way. The Court held
that Missouri could require "clear and convincing evidence" of Ms.
Cruzan's wishes.36
Although no advance directive was at issue in the case, the Court
discussed two relevant issues. First, the Court intimated that pa-
tients, even incompetent patients like Ms. Cruzan, have a right to
health treatment"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28:221-:237 (2001) (enabling use of "advance
directive[s] for mental health treatment"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, § 11001 (1993)
(authorizing "declaration[s]" for "[m]edical treatment of psychotic disorders"); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. §§ 5-601 to -618 (LexisNexis 1993) (enacting "Health Care Decisions
Act" with specific reference to mental health treatment as one aspect of advance directives);
MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 700.5501-5520 (1998) (enabling "[diesignation of patient advo-
cate[s]" for medical care and mental health care); MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 (1991) (creating
mechanism for "declaration of preferences or instructions regarding intrusive mental health
treatment"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-153 (2001) (authorizing "mental health advance
directive[s]"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:2H-102 to -125 (West 2005) (enacting the "NewJersey
Advance Directives for Mental Health Care Act"); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7B-1 to -16 (West
2006) (enacting the "Mental Health Care Treatment Decisions Act"); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 122C-71 to -77 (1997) (enabling use of "[a]dvance instruction for mental health treat-
ment"); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2135.01-14 (LexisNexis 2003) (creating mechanism for
"declaration [s] for mental health treatment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, §§ 11-101 to 11-113
(1995) (enacting the "Advance Directives for Mental Health Treatment Act"); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 127.700-.737 (1993) (enabling use of "declaration[s] for mental health treat-
ment"); 20 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5801-5845 (West 2005) (authorizing "mental health
declarations"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 27A-16-1 to -18 (1997) (approving creation of
"[d]eclaration[s] for mental illness treatment"); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-1001 to -1015
(2000) (authorizing "declaration[s] for mental health treatment"); TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM.
CODE ANN. §§ 137.001-011 (Vernon 1997) (creating mechanism for "declaration[s] for
mental health treatment"); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-15-1001 to -1004 (1996) (enabling use
of "declaration[s] for mental health treatment"); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 71.32.010-.901
(2003) (authorizing "mental health advance directive[s]"); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-22-301 to
-308 (1999) (approving creation of "psychiatric advance directives"). See also 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1395cc(f) (1990) (enacting the Patient Self-Determination Act, which requires healthcare
providers that receive federal funding to inform patients about state advance directive laws).
34. See Gallager, supra note 8, at 769.
35. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 266-68 (1990).
36. Id. at 282.
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control their own medical treatment. 3 In fact, even though the
case focused on medical treatment rather than mental health
treatment, the Court cited several of its precedents that recognized
the right of individuals with mental illnesses to reject unwanted
treatments 8 Second, the Court noted that written instructions-
such as those provided in an advance directive-are persuasive evi-
dence of an individual's "prior expressed wishes" regarding
medical treatment:s° This dicta suggests that an advance directive is
evidence of an incompetent person's wishes, which, in turn, should
be taken into account when a court decides what treatment should
be provided. Therefore, Cruzan has been viewed by some legal




Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the
right of an individual with a mental illness to engage in advance
planning, state courts have recognized such a right. In the New
York case of In re Rosa M.,4' a patient with a severe mental illness
had revoked in writing her consent to electroconvulsive therapy,
stating: "I am withdrawing my consent to electroconvulsive therapy
and am refusing any more treatments with this procedure."02 The
court held that the hospital where the patient was involuntarily
committed could not administer the treatment over her written
objection. 43 The court explained: "The fundamental right of indi-
viduals to have final say in respect to decisions regarding their
medical treatment extends equally to mentally ill persons."44 There-
fore, even involuntarily committed individuals have the right to
control their treatment through advance planning and written in-
structions.
37. Id. at 286 ("[W]e do not think the Due Process Clause requires the State to repose
judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient herself."). See also Gallagher, supra
note 8, at 769 (stating that "the Supreme Court's holding in Cruzan recognized the constitu-
tionally derived right of an incompetent patient to control the course of his or her medical
treatment.").
38. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-79 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990);
Vitek v.Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)).
39. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 284; Gallagher, supra note 8, at 770.
40. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 770.
41. In Te Rosa M., 597 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 545.
44. Id. (citing Rivers v Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 493 (1986)).
[VOL. 40:2
The Choice to Limit Choice
Similarly, in the case of In re Ingram," the Washington Supreme
Court declined to authorize surgery on a legally incompetent pa-
tient over her objections by applying the "substituted judgment"
standard.4r This standard requires the court to "ascertain the in-
competent person's actual interests and preferences" and make its
ruling based on "the decision ... which would be made by the in-
competent person, if that person were competent."07 Furthermore,
the court said, a legally incompetent person retains her "right to
choose or refuse treatment."" Thus, an incompetent person's
wishes regarding treatment must be taken into account. These
cases' analyses make the conclusions drawn from Cruzan explicit:
individuals deemed mentally incompetent have the right to control
their treatment by expressing their preferences in advance. Be-
cause written instructions provide strong evidence of an
individual's wishes, an advance directive would be very useful for a
court that is applying the substituted judgment standard. It follows
from these decisions that courts would recognize the validity of
psychiatric advance directives under the right circumstances.49
D. Essential Elements of Psychiatric Advance Directive Statutes
The challenge for state legislatures and courts is how to avoid
treating individuals with mental illnesses prejudicially while still
recognizing the unique problems that their illnesses raise. For ex-
ample, statutes must account for the fact that individuals with
mental illnesses experience alternating periods of competence and
incompetence. Therefore, statutes should supply a method for de-
termining competency so that an advance directive becomes active
if and only if the person is unable to make decisions. In addition,
to discourage bias against individuals with mental illnesses, mental
health service providers should be required to comply with psychi-
atric advance directives and should be permitted to override them
only in narrowly defined circumstances. To encourage provider
compliance with advance directives, statutes also should grant im-
munity for following the documents' instructions.
45. In re Guardianship of Ingram, 689 P.2d 1363 (Wash. 1984).
46. Id. at 1372.
47. Id. at 1370 (citing Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 752-53 (1977)).
48. Id. at 1368.
49. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 771.
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Furthermore, statutes must address the distinction between re-
fusal of treatment and election of treatment because, as Jane's
story illustrates, an individual's mental illness may cause her to re-
ject treatment when it is most needed.50 First, advance directive
statutes must permit individuals to consent in advance to intrusive
treatments like hospitalization and medication so that individuals
can choose to receive these types of treatment. Second, statutes
should enable individuals to waive their constitutional right to re-
fuse treatment, and they should prescribe a procedure for
overriding refusals. In this way, individuals like Jane will be able to
obtain treatment even when their symptoms cause them to deny
their need for it. Third, statutes need to give individuals the option
of making their advance directives irrevocable so that the directives
will remain in effect as long as they are incapable of making deci-
sions.
The next sections will examine how states have met these chal-
lenges in their advance directive laws, and how they might better
account for the complexities of chronic and episodic mental ill-
nesses. Washington State, in particular, effectively addresses many
of these issues and provides an excellent model for states that wish
to revise or adopt psychiatric advance directive statutes.
III. THE THORNY ISSUE OF COMPETENCY IN THE
MENTAL HEALTH CONTEXT
A number of challenges may hinder the enforcement of psychi-
atric advance directives, and these challenges must be addressed
when fashioning effective statutes. A unique problem for psychiat-
ric advance directives is the shifting nature of cognitive functioning
when an individual has a mental illness." Protections must be in
place to ensure that a competent person is not denied the ability to
make decisions. Conversely, there must be a method of determin-
ing when an individual is incompetent to make decisions so that
the directive will take effect. This distinction is particularly impor-
tant for directives that elect treatment because a person
experiencing an acute episode of bipolar disorder, for example,
may not recognize the need for treatment while the episode is oc-
curring.53 Therefore, an accurate and expeditious competency
50. See, e.g., Winick, supra note 13, at 70.
51. Miller, supra note 7, at 745.
52. Cuca, supra note 10, at 1164.
53. Id. at 1162 (explaining that a person's refusal of treatment can sometimes be at-
tributed entirely to symptoms of her mental illness).
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determination is required at three stages: (1) when the directive is
executed, to ensure that it actually reflects the individual's wishes;
(2) when the directive is activated and treatment is administered,
to ensure that the individual's contemporaneously expressed
wishes should be overridden; and (3) when the individual attempts
to revoke the directive, to ensure that the decision is not motivated
by symptoms of the illness.
A. Execution
Most states employ a statutory presumption in favor of compe-
tence for the execution of advance directives, even for individuals
who are committed to psychiatric hospitals. 4 This approach is sen-
sible because individuals with mental illnesses "often have a
significant capacity for normal and rational thought and behav-
ior. 5 5 Much like Jane, who leads a "normal" life most of the time,
many individuals with mental illnesses are capable of making well-
considered decisions about their treatment.
This view, of course, is not universally shared. Policymakers and
practitioners sometimes distinguish between the rights of the men-
tally ill and the non-mentally ill because they assume that mental
illness makes all treatment choices irrational. Fortunately, most
states have declined to give public credence to such biased think-
ing. These states do not presume that mental illness renders a
person generally incapable of making decisions. Therefore, indi-
viduals executing psychiatric advance directives must meet the
same standard of competency as individuals executing other ad-
vance directives.58 A different rule would unnecessarily restrict the
liberty of individuals to express their wishes simply because they
have a mental illness.
Even with the statutory presumption of competence, mental
health service providers may still be reluctant to rely on an advance
directive if they cannot verify that the document actually reflects
54. Winick, supra note 13, at 68 n.39.
55. Id. at 67.
56. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 776; BAZELON CENTER, supra note 20, § Consumers and
Providers Speak Out, at p. 5 (reporting the views of some providers who believed that men-
tal health consumers were never competent to make decisions about treatment in advance
directives).
57. Winick, supra note 13, at 67 n.39 (noting that the statutory presumption of compe-
tence extends to involuntarily committed individuals in most states).
58. See Winick, supra note 13, at 67.
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the individual's competent wishes.59 As one solution to this prob-
lem, some states require a psychiatric advance directive to be
signed by at least one witness, who must attest to the individual's
sound mind and the lack of duress or undue influence. ° Louisiana
also requires a written mental status examination by a physician or
psychologist that confirms the individual's decision-making capac-
ity.6 For the reasons already discussed, this statutory requirement
reveals bias against individuals with mental illnesses because they
are treated differently on account of their illnesses. Still, consider-
ing the reality of provider reluctance, individuals may wish to
include a similar attestation by an independent psychiatrist to in-
crease the chances that their directives will be enforced.62
B. Activation
1. Selecting the Standard for Activation
A more complicated question is how to determine competency
when the advance directive is activated and treatment is actually
administered. Three standards could be used in making this de-
termination: (1) legal incompetence (e.g., the standard for
guardianship proceedings);63 (2) decision-making capacity (e.g.,
the standard for giving informed consent to medical decisions);"
or (3) dangerousness or severe disability (e.g., the standard for in-
voluntary commitment proceedings).6 5 Both legal competency and
involuntary commitment standards are insufficient for facilitating
early treatment. Instead, decision-making capacity should be the
standard for determining when psychiatric advance directives be-
come active.
59. Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 29, at 257.
60. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-105 (West 2005) (requiring one witness who can-
not be related to the individual by blood or marriage and cannot be the individual's mental
health service provider); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-1004(a-b) (2000) (requiring two witnesses
who cannot be affiliated with the individual's mental health service provider).
61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:224 (2001).
62. Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 29, at 257.
63. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.010 (2006) (granting courts, and only courts, the
power to appoint guardians for persons who have a "significant risk of personal harm" or
"financial harm" because of an inability to provide for their needs or manage their fi-
nances).
64. See David R. Patterson et al., When Life Support Is Questioned Early in the Care of Pa-
tients with Cervical-Level Quadriplegia, 328 NEW ENG.J. MED. 506 (1993).
65. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE § 71.05.150(1)(b) (2006) (authorizing involuntary
commitment when a court finds that an individual presents "a likelihood of serious harm" or
is "gravely disabled").
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First, it is important to distinguish between legal incompetence
and the incapacity to make treatment decisions because they do
not always overlap. Although both standards define a person's
cognitive functioning, legal competence must usually be deter-
mined by a court, whereas capacity determinations are made by
medical professionals. 66 The distinction is crucial because many
individuals with mental illnesses are legally competent when in cri-
sis (i.e., a court has not yet ruled to the contrary), but they may be
indecisive, ambivalent, or "unable or unwilling to make reasoned
decisions about their care." 7 This twilight of decision-making ca-
pacity has been termed "quasi-competence."6 If a court
determination is necessary to activate a psychiatric advance direc-
tive, many individuals will not be able to obtain the treatment that
they want and need to prevent a severe deterioration in their cog-
nitive faculties.69
In Washington, a similar story inspired a senator to sponsor the
psychiatric advance directive legislation.70 A man with schizophre-
nia would periodically stop taking his medication and end up on
the streets, threatening people and sometimes landing in jail or an
emergency room.' His family wanted a way to "break this cycle"
and obtain earlier treatment for him, when the symptoms first pre-
sented themselves.72 The desire to receive earlier treatment is a
motivating force for some individuals, like Jane, who execute ad-
vance directives, and this objective cannot always be achieved by a
court proceeding.
7 3
Like legal incompetence, the standard for involuntary commit-
ment is inadequate for facilitating early treatment. Families
frequently are frustrated by the high thresholds for involuntary
commitment.7 4 In the absence of an advance directive, involuntary
commitment is the primary means of treating individuals with
mental illnesses when they refuse treatment. In Washington, for
example, a person must be "gravely disabled" or pose a "likelihood
of serious harm" to herself or others before she can be treated
66. Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal Com-
petence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 345, 348-49 (1996).
67. La Fond & Srebnik, supra note 2, at 539.
68. Id.
69. See infra Part III.B.2.
70. Anderson, supra note 28, at 803.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See infra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the barriers presented by court proceed-
ings.
74. Anderson, supra note 28, at 800-01.
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against her will.75 As one individual with a mental illness testified,
"When someone is allowed to 'decompose' so severely before they
can get help under the Involuntary Treatment Act, they never
come back quite the same."76 Similar to Jane's experience, an indi-
vidual with a mental illness can be legally competent and not
dangerous, while still being unable to make rational decisions dur-
ing episodes of her illness. Therefore, a different procedure is
needed for individuals who desire early treatment but whose ill-
nesses may prevent them from recognizing it at the time.
Some state legislatures have implicitly acknowledged the need to
distinguish between commitment standards and capacity to make
healthcare decisions. For example, Hawaii's statute provides that
the directive becomes effective when the individual lacks capacity,
which is defined as the "ability to understand the significant bene-
fits, risks, and alternatives to proposed mental health care or
treatment and to make and communicate a mental health care de-
cision."77 Similarly, psychiatric advance directives become operable
in several other states when the individual is "incapable," which
means that the "ability to receive and evaluate information effec-
tively or communicate decisions is impaired to such an extent that
the person currently lacks the capacity to make mental health
treatment decisions."78 Thus, for the advance directive to be acti-
vated, the individual need not be dangerous to herself or others, as
is frequently required for involuntary commitment. Instead, she
must have an impaired ability to understand information and make
decisions, which is a definition that "quasi-competent" individuals
will more readily satisfy.
On the other hand, a lower standard for activating psychiatric
advance directives increases the possibility that individuals will have
their decision-making authority taken away prematurely.7 9 The
75. In re Guardianship of Anderson, 564 P.2d 1190, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (citing
WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.150(1)(b) (2006)). The Washington legislature defines "gravely
disabled" as an individual suffering from a mental disorder who either "[i]s in danger of
serious physical harm resulting from a failure to provide for his or her essential human
needs" or "manifests severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and
escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 71.05.020(16). A "likelihood of serious harm" to self or others includes physical harm only
(e.g., threats or attempts to commit suicide, threats or acts of violence). Id. § 71.05.020(19).
76. Anderson, supra note 28, at 801 (recounting testimony as paraphrased by a legisla-
tive assistant).
77. HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 327G-2, -5 (2004).
78. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 66-601(4), -605(1) (1998); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 43/5(5),
43/25 (1995) (using same language as the Idaho Code); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.700(5), .710
(1993) (using same language as the Idaho Code); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-15-1001(3), -
1002(4) (1996) (using same language as the Idaho Code).
79. La Fond & Srebnik, supra note 2, at 539.
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"one-size-fits-all" standards for incapacity also do not account for
the unique ways in which mental illness manifests itself among in-
dividuals. In response to these concerns, some states have provided
flexibility for individuals to determine their own standards of inca-
pacity.s In Washington and Pennsylvania, for example, the
individual may designate when the directive becomes effective."'
Hence, the individual could specify any circumstances that consti-
tute early warning signs for her experience of the illness. For
instance, Jane might specify that she wants her directive to be acti-
vated when she stops sleeping or when she accumulates a certain
amount of debt, since those are symptoms she experienced be-
fore.82 Or she could decide that she wants to be admitted for
treatment upon the recommendation of her personal psychiatrist
or a close family member, since they would be able to recognize
deviations from her typical behavior. 3 Individuals with episodic
illnesses, such as bipolar disorder, have the advantage of past ex-
perience to inform their decisions about when their directives
should become active.84
A flexible activation standard enables individuals with mental
illnesses to retain more control over their treatment and recog-
nizes that they are generally capable of making their own
decisions.80 The New York Court of Appeals confirmed the right of
individuals with mental illnesses to retain that type of control:
"This right [of self-determination] extends equally to mentally ill
persons who are not to be treated as persons of lesser status or dig-
nity because of their illness., 86 In sum, the flexible activation
standards developed by some states allow individuals to tailor their
advance directives more specifically to their needs, and that
80. Id.
81. 20 PA. STAT. ANN. §5824(a)(2) (West 2005); WASH. REv. CODE § 71.32.060(3)
(2003).
82. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 752; La Fond & Srebnik, supra note 2, at 540.
83. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 752; La Fond & Srebnik, supra note 2, at 540.
84. Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 29, at 257. The benefit of past experience is one
significant difference between psychiatric advance directives and directives dealing with end-
of-life issues. Individuals with mental illness have experienced episodes in the past, so they
can identify the warning signs and they know which treatments work for them. On the other
hand, major medical crises happen rarely in an individual's lifetime, so it is nearly impossi-
ble to articulate specific, accurate choices about what one would want in hypothetical
situations. See Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 30, 34-35.
85. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 777 ("The courts have made clear that neither the
fact of psychiatric illness itself, nor the fact of commitment for psychiatric treatment, is tan-
tamount to a determination of incompetence to make treatment decisions.").
86. Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that involuntarily commit-
ted patients have the right to refuse antipsychotic medication).
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flexibility promotes equal treatment for individuals with mental
illnesses.
2. Method of Determining Competency
State statutes also should specify who determines competency
and how. One traditional method of determining competency is
the three-part Beck test, which is typically administered by a court
when an individual is refusing treatment."7 The court must answer
three questions: (1) Is the individual aware that she has a mental
illness? (2) Does she have sufficient knowledge about the illness
and its treatments? (3) Is she free of delusional beliefs in making
her decision to refuse treatment? " If the answer to any of these
questions is "no," then the individual is deemed incompetent to
make decisions about treatment.8 9 Although there is nothing em-
pirically limiting about the test itself, administration of the
assessment as part of a court proceeding may diminish the effec-
tiveness of advance directives. First, court proceedings delay
decision-making and are insufficient for individuals who need im-
mediate treatment.9° Second, the public nature of court
proceedings can cause social consequences and psychological
damage. 9' One response to these concerns would be accelerated
court proceedings to determine competency, which would require
changes in the judicial system that might be difficult to imple-
ment.
92
Another alternative would be capacity determinations by health-
care providers using the Beck criteria or other proven assessments,
which could be authorized by statute or written directly into an in-
dividual's advance directive9 Psychiatric advance directive statutes
often permit the capacity determination to be made by healthcare
providers instead of requiring a formal competency assessment by
the courts. For instance, in a number of states, the determination
may be made by two providers.94 At least one state allows the de-
87. Cuca, supra note 10, at 1169. See, e.g., In re Lambert, 437 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Minn.
CL App. 1989) (upholding order to medicate a committed patient involuntarily).
88. In iv Peterson, 446 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
89. Id.
90. Cuca, supra note 10, at 1178.
91. Winick, supra note 13, at 84.
92. Cuca, supra note 10, at 1182.
93. Id. at 1182-83; Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 29, at 257.
94. HAw. REV. STAT. § 327G-7(d) (2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-601(4) (1998); 755
ILL. COMP. STAT. 43/5(5) (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:226(A) (2001); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 127.700(5) (1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-1001 (3) (1996). But see TEx. Civ. PRAC. &
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termination to be made by a single provider.95 This alternative
represents one of the benefits of psychiatric advance directives: the
"ability to effectuate the patient's intent without the delay, expense,
and humiliation of going to court., 96 Accordingly, many states
agree about who should determine capacity: healthcare providers.
How providers should make the determinations, however, is
more difficult to answer because there is no "gold standard" in-
strument for assessing decision-making capacity.97 As a first step,
Professors Paul S. Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso at the University
of Massachusetts Medical School have developed an instrument
that assesses decision-making capacity.9 The structured interview
evaluates the individual's ability to: communicate treatment
choices, understand relevant information, appreciate the nature of
the situation and likely consequences, and weigh potential risks
and benefits of decisions.:'9 New Mexico offers similar guidance in
its statute. The statute requires a written certification of incapacity
by two providers that details the individual's ability to understand
the nature, consequences, benefits, and risks of proposed treat-
ments and her ability to communicate a choice about treatment.'0
The statute even includes a sample certification form.'0 ' Both the
Appelbaum/Grisso instrument and the New Mexico statute pro-
vide useful models for capacity determinations that can be
administered by healthcare providers.
In sum, to facilitate early treatment, state statutes ideally should
consider two issues when defining the activation point for psychiat-
iic advance directives. First, individuals should have the flexibility
to specify the circumstances under which their directives become
active. Second, healthcare providers should be permitted to evalu-
ate decision-making capacity, using assessments developed for that
purpose.
REM. CODE ANN. § 137.001(6) (Vernon 1997) (stating that a determination of incapacity can
only be made by a court in a guardianship proceeding or a medication hearing).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-72(4) (1997).
96. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 779.
97. Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 29, at 257.
98. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to
Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635-36 (1988). See also Srebnik & Brodoff, supra
note 29, at 257 (describing capacity assessments).
99. Appelbaum & Grisso, supra note 98, at 1635-36.
100. N.M. STAT. § 24-7B-5(F--G) (West 2006).
101. Id.§24-7B-5(G).
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C. Revocation
The third stage, revocation, is particularly important for indi-
viduals who execute advance directives with the goal of overriding
illness-induced refusals of treatment. If the individual could revoke
the directive at any time, then she would be able to do so during
an acute episode, when she most needs the treatment. For exam-
ple, in Jane's situation, the manic episode impaired her judgment
and she acted out in self-destructive ways, but the illness prevented
her from recognizing the problems with her behavior. Because she
refused to accept treatment and did not meet the involuntary
commitment standards in her state, she was allowed to continue on
her devastating path. After recovering from the episode, she exe-
cuted a directive with the express intent of averting similar
situations in the future. Jane sought prospectively to bind herself to
treatment in preparation for future episodes because she knew that
the illness would likely cause her to refuse treatment again. Yet, if
she were allowed to revoke the directive at any time, she could re-
voke it during a manic episode and her intent would not be
effectuated.
States have approached the issue of revocation from three direc-
tions, which might be called "restrictive," "liberal," and "flexible."
States favoring the restrictive approach require a capacity determi-
nation before allowing an individual to revoke a psychiatric
advance directive. In these states, when an individual wants to re-
voke her directive, her competency would be assessed in a manner
similar to that used at activation. 0 2 Many states require that indi-
viduals be "capable" or "competent," as determined by healthcare
providers or a court, before permitting revocation.
10 3
At least one state prefers the liberal approach, allowing revoca-
tion at any time regardless of the individual's mental state.
Kentucky permits a psychiatric advance directive to be revoked
when any of the following actions are taken: the individual signs
and dates a document expressing her intent to revoke; the individ-
102. Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 29, at 261; see also Miller, supra note 7, at 745.
103. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-602 (1998) ("A declaration may be revoked in whole or in
part at any time by the principal if the principal is not incapable."); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
43/50 (1995) ("A declaration may be revoked in whole or in part by written statement at any
time by the principal if the principal is not incapable."); LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 28:231
(2001) (substantially the same language as the Idaho Code); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B,
§ 11001 (12) (1993) (requiring that the individual be "in a state of remission" and "compe-
tent"); MINN. STAT. § 253B.03(6)(d) (1991) (requiring competence); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 53-21-153(4) (2001) (allowing revocation if mental health professional "determines in
good faith that the individual has sufficient mental capacity"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-74(j)
(1997) (substantially the same language as the Idaho Code).
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ual makes an oral statement to the same effect; or the individual
destroys her directive. 114 These liberal revocation options provide
insufficient protection for individuals like Jane. Although Kentucky
is arguably attempting to promote patient sel-determination by
allowing individuals to change their minds easily, the liberal ap-
proach harms those individuals who would choose irrevocability as
a means to prevent severe deterioration in their conditions.
The flexible middle ground is the best option because it allows
the individual to decide how revocation will be accomplished. Sev-
eral states have selected this approach. In Arizona, revocation is
permitted at any time "[u] nless limited by the express authority in
the document."'0 5 In New Jersey, the individual may choose to
make the directive irrevocable, but revocability is presumed if the
individual does not express a preference.' °6 Thus, revocation at any
time is the default rule, but the Arizona and NewJersey legislatures
explicitly permit individuals to change the default rule by includ-
ing different instructions in their directives. Washington has
selected the opposite default rule: an individual may revoke the
directive only when she has capacity, unless the individual elected
at the time of creating the document to enable revocation while
incapacitated. 07
Either default rule is adequate as long as the rule is clearly
communicated to individuals who execute psychiatric advance di-
rectives. Most importantly, the flexibility provided by these statutes
allows individuals like Jane, who wish to protect themselves from
the effects of their illnesses, to choose irrevocability. At the same
time, the statutes permit other individuals, who wish to keep their
options open, to choose revocability. In some cases, the individual
may want to specify additional criteria that must be satisfied before
allowing revocation, such as requiring the approval of her decision-
making agent or personal psychiatrist. In those cases, a formula-
tion like Arizona's would be preferable because it grants the
individual broad authority to craft a tailored solution for her
unique needs.
In conclusion, competency is a challenging issue for individuals
with mental illnesses because their decision-making ability varies
over time. Advance directives are a valuable tool to help individuals
104. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.428 (LexisNexis 2003). Most states that have only gen-
eral durable power of attorney statutes also allow revocation at any time. Gallagher, supra
note 8, at 778.
105. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-3285 (LexisNexis 1999).
106. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-106(b) (West 2005).
107. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.080(1) (2003).
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manage their illnesses, but they must be used carefully. For indi-
viduals like Jane, advance directives need to become active when
their decision-making is compromised, and remain effective until
their cognitive faculties are restored. Because each individual's
needs and preferences are unique, state statutes should allow indi-
viduals to decide when their directives are activated and when they
can be revoked. Washington's flexible scheme enables individuals
like Jane to receive early treatment and preempt the devastating
consequences of their illnesses.
IV. THE CHALLENGE PRESENTED BY THE RIGHT
TO REFUSE TREATMENT
A. Federal Caselaw
1. The Right to Refuse Treatment
In addition to competency issues, constitutional rights may also
complicate an individual's ability to override illness-induced refus-
als of treatment through an advance directive. The Supreme Court
has established a constitutionally protected right to refuse medical
treatment.08 The Court has held in several cases that individuals
have a significant liberty interest in avoiding unwanted mental
health medication and hospitalization.'19 In Vitek v. Jones,"° the
Court held that the involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a mental
hospital "implicate [d] a liberty interest that is protected by the Due
Process Clause."" The Court directed that certain procedures
must be followed for involuntary hospitalization, including notice
and a hearing."
12
In Washington v. Harper, 3 a prisoner housed in the mental
health unit challenged the prison's policy of administering psychi-
atric medication over prisoners' objections when they were "gravely
108. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Mental Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990). Although
Cruzan only assumed the existence of the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment,
the later case of Washington v. Glucksberg went further, declaring that the Court in Cruzan
found that the right to refuse treatment deserved special protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721-22 n.17 (1997).
109. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135
(1992); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480,
495-96 (1980).
110. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 495-96.
111. Id. at 487-88.
112. Id. at 495-96.
113. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
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disabled" or posed a "likelihood of serious harm."' 4 The Court
recognized that the prisoner "possesse[d] a significant liberty in-
terest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." '15 However, the Court also held that the right was qualified
by important state interests." 6 Moreover, the Court declared that
forced medication in the prison environment satisfies due process
requirements as long as "the inmate is dangerous to himself or oth-
ers and the treatment is in the inmate's medical interest."' 7 These
cases establish the right to refuse unwanted mental health treat-
ment, but they also clarify that the right is limited by the state's
police power, which is particularly strong in the prison context.
Although the Supreme Court does not appear to have addressed
this exact issue outside the prison context, two Courts of Appeals
have acknowledged that patients in psychiatric hospitals also have a
qualified constitutional right to refuse psychiatric medication. In
Rogers v. Okin,"8 a group of psychiatric patients brought suit against
a hospital for its forcible medication of patients." 9 The First Circuit
held that state law created a constitutionally protected liberty in-
terest in avoiding forcible medication.2 0 Citing Vitek, the court
announced that certain procedures were required to override the
individual's right to refuse medication. 2 In Rennie v. Klein,2 2 the
Third Circuit noted that an involuntarily committed patient had a
"constitutional right to refuse antipsychotic drugs."2 3 But that right
is not absolute: if the patient posed a danger to himself or others
(the standard under state law) and his healthcare providers deter-
mined that medication was necessary, then the providers'
judgment was presumptively valid. 24 To overcome that presump-
tion, the patient would have to prove that the decision was a
"substantial departure" from accepted medical standards or prac-
tice.12 Therefore, although some protection exists for the right to
refuse mental health treatment, this right can be outweighed by
114. Id. at 215.
115. Id. at 222.
116. Id. at 227.
117. Id.
118. Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984).
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 6.
121. Id. at 7-9.
122. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir. 1983).
123. Id. at 269.
124. Id. (quotingYoungberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
125. Id.
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important state interests, such as securing the safety of patients and
third parties.
2. No Right to Obtain Treatment
The right to obtain treatment, on the other hand, is not consti-
tutionally protected in the same manner.26 The courts do not
recognize a constitutional right to psychiatric hospitalization. In
Wilson v. Formigoni,121 the Seventh Circuit held that there was "no
constitutional right.., to be involuntarily committed in a mental
health facility." 28 In addition to judicial pronouncements on this
issue, a number of practical obstacles may prevent individuals from
obtaining treatment that they request in their directives, including:
limited financial resources; treatment methods banned by profes-
sional ethics; medication unapproved by the FDA; restrictions in
insurance policies or government benefit programs; the liberty in-
terests of healthcare providers, who cannot be forced to provide
treatment with which they disagree or that is contrary to accepted
medical practice; and public policy considerations. 29 In sum, even
if an individual elects to receive treatment in a psychiatric advance
directive, there is no guarantee that she will be able to obtain it.
B. State Statutory Solutions
The combination of these two propositions-the right to refuse
treatment and the absence of a right to obtain treatment-raises a
troubling possibility for individuals like Jane who wish to protect
their future interests by executing advance directives. Despite their
specific instructions to the contrary, these individuals may not be
able to receive treatment if their illnesses cause them to refuse it at
critical times. An individual's "present unwillingness" to accept
treatment implicates the right to refuse treatment and defeats the
"previously given consent" in her advance directive.'30 Fortunately,
state law can resolve this dilemma. Because the election of treat-
ment is not subject to the same constitutional protections as the
126. Winick, supra note 13, at 70; Gallagher, supra note 8, at 773.
127. Wilson v. Formigoni, 42 F.3d 1060 (7th Cir. 1994).
128. Id. at 1066.
129. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 773; Winick, supra note 13, at 70.
130. Anderson, supra note 28, at 796.
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refusal of treatment, states have greater latitude to craft solutions
for treatment-election scenarios.
131
1. Advance Consent to Intrusive Treatments
To be effective for individuals like Jane, psychiatric advance di-
rective statutes must enable individuals to consent to mental health
treatment in advance-particularly intrusive treatments. For ex-
ample, antipsychotic medications are considered intrusive because
of their side effects. 132 Nevertheless, many mental illnesses can be
stabilized by medications, so individuals should be allowed to
choose that type of treatment. But not all states agree with this
proposition. In Kentucky's psychiatric advance directive statute,
individuals are limited to including "one or more of the following"
in their directives: refusal of specific medications or electric shock
therapy and "stated preferences" for medications or emergency
interventions. 3 3 An individual's request to receive treatment ap-
pears to be less enforceable because the term "preferences"
suggests that complying with the individual's instructions is op-
tional, while "refusal" is a clear restriction. Yet, providing treatment
is often consistent with the individual's best interest, so psychiatric
advance directives that request treatment should not be relegated
to a lower status.
1 3 4
Many statutes specify that psychiatric advance directives "may in-
clude consent to or refusal of mental health treatment.
135
However, only a few statutes explicitly authorize individuals to con-
sent to intrusive treatments in their directives. For example, North
Carolina's statute authorizes individuals to "grant or withhold au-
thority for mental health treatment, including, but not limited to,
the use of psychotropic medication, electroconvulsive treatment,
and admission to and retention in a facility for the care or treat-
ment of mental illness."1 6 In states that specifically define
131. Winick, supra note 13, at 71.
132. Gallagher, supra note 8, at 761.
133. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.422(1) (LexisNexis 2003).
134. Gallager, supra note 8, at 782.
135. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-602 (1998); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 43/10 (1995); MINN.
STAr. § 253B.03(6) (d) (1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 122C-73(a), (b) (1997).
136. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-73(cl) (1997). See also IND. CODE § 16-36-1.7-3 (2004)
(enabling an individual to consent to hospital admission, medication, seclusion, restraint,
electroconvulsive therapy); MINN. STAT. § 253B.03(6)(d) (1991) (allowing a proxy decision-
maker to "make decisions about intrusive mental health treatment").
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treatment in a similar manner, individuals can consent in advance
to hospitalization and medication.
But authorization to consent to treatment in advance still pro-
vides inadequate protection for individuals, like Jane, whose
illnesses cause them to refuse treatment during acute episodes.
Unless state law explicitly allows it, healthcare providers may be
hesitant to hospitalize individuals over their objections, even if an
advance directive consents to that type of treatment. 3 The Wash-
ington statute solves this problem by establishing a procedure for
these individuals to consent to treatment in advance and for pro-
viders to override illness-induced refusals.13 8 The provision only
applies under certain conditions. First, the individual must have
chosen for the directive to be irrevocable during incapacity.3" Sec-
ond, she must have consented to inpatient mental health
treatment in the directive' 4° Third, she must be refusing treatment
at the time of admission. 4 ' Where these conditions are met, the
individual may be admitted if a provider takes the following ac-
tions: (1) evaluates her mental condition and determines that she
is incapacitated, (2) obtains the informed consent of the agent (if
any), (3) makes a written determination that she needs treatment
that cannot be given in a "less restrictive setting," and (4) docu-
ments these findings in the medical chart.' 42 These procedures
enable individuals like Jane to obtain treatment even when they
refuse to cooperate, which may be the precise reason why they
executed advance directives in the first place.
In sum, to be effective for individuals who wish to elect treat-
ment in advance, state statutes should enable them to consent to
intrusive treatments in their directives. Furthermore, to be most
effective for individuals like Jane, states should follow Washington's
example and specify a procedure to override illness-induced refus-
als.
2. Waiver of the Right to Refuse
Consenting to treatment and surrendering the right to refuse
treatment implicate different rights. 43 Thus, in addition to provid-
137. Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 29, at 261.
138. WASH. REv. CODE § 71.32.140 (2003).
139. Id. § 71.32.140(1)(a).
140. Id. § 71.32.140(1)(b).
141. Id. § 7 1.32.140(1)(c).
142. Id. § 71.32.140(2).
143. Anderson, supra note 28, at 805.
[VOL. 40:2
The Choice to Limit Choice
ing consent, the individual must clearly waive the right to refuse
treatment in her directive. To waive a fundamental right, the Su-
preme Court requires the waiver to be "knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent.", 44 Although the right to refuse mental health treat-
ment has not been declared fundamental, it does receive some
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 145 Therefore, an
explicit waiver may be required.
Research did not reveal any state directly addressing this issue in
the language of its psychiatric advance directive statute. However,
Washington includes some language in its form directive that
might be a first step toward meeting the waiver requirement. The
form describes the irrevocability option as follows: "I understand
that choosing this option means I may only revoke this directive if I
have capacity. I further understand that if I choose this option and
become incapacitated while this directive is in effect, I may receive
treatment that I specify in this directive, even if I object at the
time. "0 4" This waiver directly addresses Jane's dilemma, allowing her
to clearly express her intent that the directive's instructions should
override her objections when she is incapacitated.
Of course, the "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" waiver re-
quires more than just checking a box on a form: Jane must
comprehend what she is agreeing to and the consequences of that
decision. First, she must know that she has a right to refuse treat-
ment so that she understands what she is giving up. To facilitate
that understanding, the form could include an explanation of pa-
tient rights. Additionally, the directive would most likely be upheld
if she explained her reasons for wanting to waive the right to refuse
treatment.147 For example: "In the past, a manic episode almost ru-
ined my life and I want to stop that from happening again. When I
am manic, I do not realize that I need treatment because the ill-
ness takes away my ability to make good decisions for myself. I am
writing this directive because I want to be able to get treatment
while I am manic, even if I am saying that I do not want treatment
at the time." To encourage this type of narrative, the form could
ask an open-ended question such as: "Why would you want to re-
ceive treatment if you are saying 'no' at the time? Is there
something about your illness or your history that makes you want
to choose this option?" As another alternative, the individual could
144. Id. at 796 n.9 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).
145. See supra Part 1VA..
146. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.260 (2003).
147. See Gallagher, supra note 8, at 778 (recommending that individuals include reasons
for their decisions when executing psychiatric advance directives).
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make an audiotaped or videotaped statement that explains her
reasons.148 Washington has taken the first step toward facilitating a
waiver of the right to refuse treatment, but further safeguards are
needed to ensure that individuals understand their directives and
to increase provider compliance.
The constitutional right to refuse treatment presents a potential
obstacle for individuals like Jane who want to obtain treatment
when their illnesses cause them to refuse it. Other states should
follow Washington's lead to help individuals overcome this obsta-
cle. First, statutes should specifically permit individuals to consent
to intrusive treatments, such as medication and hospitalization, in
their directives. Second, statutes should detail a procedure for
healthcare providers to follow when an individual with compro-
mised decision-making ability is refusing treatment that she
requested in her directive. Finally, statutes should facilitate an ex-
press waiver of the right to refuse treatment for those individuals
who choose to have their directives override refusals.
V. ENCOURAGING THE COOPERATION OF MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICE PROVIDERS
A. The Duty to Comply and Exceptions
In order for psychiatric advance directives to be enforced in
practice, mental health service providers must be willing to follow
their instructions. Reports indicate that compliance with medical
care directives occurs twenty to fifty percent of the time, though
some observers believe that the rates for psychiatric advance direc-
tives may be higher.149 To increase compliance rates, statutes should
explicitly instruct providers to follow directives. A number of stat-
utes do include a duty to comply.50
Yet, many statutes also establish mechanisms for overriding psy-
chiatric advance directives. Most commonly, states empower
providers to override a directive when a court order contradicts the
directive or when there is a life-threatening or health-endangering
148. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-105 (West 2005) (stating that a directive may be sup-
plemented with an audiotape or videotape).
149. Debra S. Srebnik & John Q. La Fond, Advance Directives for Mental Health Treatment
50 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 919, 921 (1999).
150. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-605(1) (1998) ("The physician or provider shall act
in accordance with an operative declaration when the principal has been found to be inca-
pable."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-74(g) (1997) (substantially the same as the Idaho Code);
20 PA. STAT. ANN. § 5804(a)(1) (West 2005) ("An attending physician and mental health
care provider shall comply with mental health declarations and powers of attorney.").
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emergency. 51 Other typical override provisions authorize the pro-
vider to act in a manner contrary to the directive if the directive is
inconsistent with "reasonable medical practice," if requested
treatments are unavailable, or if compliance would violate the
law.' 5 2 These overrides are reasonable because providers must con-
sider not only the individual's preferences but their own ethical
and legal duties as well.
5 3
Nonetheless, a more critical analysis reveals that some override
provisions may be driven by prejudice against individuals with
mental illnesses, based on the belief that they cannot make rational
decisions for themselves. For example, the Michigan statute au-
thorizes durable powers of attorney for both medical care and
mental health care.54 Yet, the override provisions regarding rea-
sonable medical practice, availability of treatments, and
compliance with the law only apply to mental health care. 55 If
these overrides were motivated solely by concerns about providers'
ethical and legal duties, then they should also apply to medical
care. In contrast, the Maryland provision that "[e] thically inappro-
priate treatment [is] not required" applies equally to medical and
mental health care. 5 Michigan's choice to expand the overrides in
the mental health context signals that the legislature did not com-
pletely trust individuals with mental illnesses to make their own
decisions and felt compelled to give providers a means of circum-
venting the wishes of those individuals.
Indiana's statute exemplifies even more blatant paternalism,
stating, "This chapter does not preclude an attending physician
from treating the patient in a manner that is [in] the best interest
151. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 327G-8(a) (2004); 755 ILL. COMp. STAT. 43/45(1)
(1995); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.426(2) (LexisNexis 2003); TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 137.008 (Vernon 1997).
152. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-605(2) (1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.426(1)
(LexisNexis 2003); MICH. COMp. LAWs § 700.5511(4) (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-74(g)
(1997).
153. Several arguments have been made against these override provisions. For example,
the Bazelon Center criticizes the "availability" override because of its ambiguity: "Conceiva-
bly, the phrase could refer to economic or geographic availability or inadequate numbers of
trained staff." BAZELON CENTER, supra note 20, § Analysis of State Laws, at p. 5. As for the
"reasonable medical practice" override, "objections ... have been raised because [it] subor-
dinate[s] consumer preferences set forth in [psychiatric advance directives] to routine
practice." Srebnik & Brodoff, supra note 29, at 258. Providing definitions of the terminology
in the statutes might resolve some of these concerns.
154. MICH. COMp. LAws § 700.5506 (1998).
155. Id. § 700.5511(4) (1998).
156. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-611 (LexisNexis 1993) (stating that the provi-
sion applies to "this subtitle," which includes advance directives for mental health services in
Section 5-602.1 and advance directives for health care generally in Section 5-602).
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of the patient or another individual." 7 This override provision al-
lows providers to disregard psychiatric advance directives whenever
they disagree about the most effective treatment. As a result, the
directives become practically unenforceable. In light of new fed-
eral caselaw, states should be careful about unequal treatment of
individuals with mental illnesses in their advance directive statutes.
In Hargrave v. Vermont,"" the Second Circuit condemned the same
type of prejudice that likely animated the Michigan and Indiana
override provisions. The court held that an override provision in
Vermont's durable power of attorney statute that applied only to
mentally ill individuals constituted discrimination.'6
Several states have developed more respectful methods for han-
dling situations in which providers disagree with directives. The
Louisiana statute allows a directive to be overridden in emergen-
cies or when "the treating physician determines that psychotropic
medication is essential." 'o Although the latter exception might
seem similar to those discussed above, it is, in fact, quite different
because the statute delineates extensive procedures to be followed
before override is permitted.'6 ' As an initial matter, the director of
the facility must conduct an administrative review, which provides
the individual with notice and a hearing.6 2 In addition, the statute
identifies the criteria on which the override decision must be
based, including: (1) the degree of danger posed by the individual
to herself or others, (2) whether the treatment is "the least restric-
tive alternative" and the "most medically appropriate," and (3) a
balancing of the risks and benefits. 63 All of these requirements
seek to protect the individual's rights, and they ensure that health-
care providers will only override her wishes when it is absolutely
necessary.
As a second example, Pennsylvania and Tennessee have devel-
oped a different solution to the problem of provider disagreement
with directives. The Pennsylvania statute requires a provider who
"cannot in good conscience comply with a declaration" to "make
every reasonable effort to assist in the transfer of the declarant or
principal to another physician or mental health care provider who
will comply." 4 Tennessee's statute contains a similar provision that
157. IND. CODE § 16-36-1.7-5 (2004).
158. Hargrave v. Vermont, 340 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2003).
159. Id. at 37.




164. 20 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5804(a) (2), (b) (West 2005).
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directs the provider to "arrange for the prompt and orderly trans-
fer of the patient to the care of others" when the provider is
unwilling to carry out the instructions in a directive.'5 This com-
promise respects the rights of the doctor, who is not forced to
provide treatment under protest, while still respecting the rights of
the individual, who is given the maximum opportunity to receive
her preferred treatment.
After the Hargrave decision, it is discriminatory for advance di-
rective overrides to be more extensive in the mental health context
than in the medical context. Some overrides are reasonable, such
as those that permit advance directives to be disobeyed in life-
threatening emergencies or when the instructions violate the law.
Nevertheless, states should be cautious about permitting health-
care providers to override directives when they merely disagree
with the instructions. Statutory provisions that establish specific
criteria or transfer procedures in such situations offer an attractive
compromise between the rights of doctors and the rights of pa-
tients.
B. Provider Immunity
In a study by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law,'" many
mental health service providers supported the use of advance di-
rectives, but they were also concerned about how advance
directives would affect their legal and ethical responsibilities. In
response to their legal concerns, statutes should grant immunity
for providers who make good-faith efforts to comply with direc-
tives.1"'
Some statutes do not mention immunity at all, 69 which is clearly
insufficient to allay the concerns of providers. Other statutes grant
immunity for certain actions but not others. For example, several
states protect healthcare providers from civil and criminal liability
if they administer or fail to administer treatment in reliance on a
165. TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-6-1005(c) (2000).
166. The Bazelon Center conducted a three-year study "to explore the legal enforce-
ability of advance directives for psychiatric care and promote their use." BAZELON CENTER,
supra note 20, § Introduction and Summary, at p. 1. As part of the study, the Bazelon Center
asked consumers and providers for their opinions about psychiatric advance directives. Id.
167. Id.
168. See Winick, supra note 13, at 71 n.49.
169. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-3281 to -3287 (LexisNexis 1999); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 202A.420-.432 (LexisNexis 2003).
WINTER 20071
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
directive that turns out to be invalid.170 At least one state grants
immunity only when a provider fails to treat an individual in ac-
cordance with her directive because the provider is unaware of the
directive's existence.17' These narrow grants of immunity are
unlikely to reassure providers who are trying to decide whether or
not to follow an individual's directive.
Washington appears to offer the most comprehensive protection
for providers. The statute grants immunity when providers: (1) act
in accordance with a directive that turns out to be invalid, (2) pro-
vide treatment without knowledge of the directive, (3) determine
that the individual is or is not incapacitated, (4) override the direc-
tive for one of the permitted reasons, or (5) provide treatment in
accordance with the directive. 172 Other states have included several
of these categories in their immunity grants.113 However, research
did not reveal any other state that included all five categories. Sur-
prisingly, the fifth category has not been adopted in many states.
Yet, immunizing providers for treating an individual in accordance
with her directive may be the most important immunity in the ma-
jority of cases to encourage compliance because the instructions in
a directive may not correspond with the course of treatment that
the provider would recommend. Therefore, providers may need
extra assurance that they will not be penalized for promoting pa-
tient preferences over their own medical judgments. In sum, states
should grant broad immunity for providers, as in Washington, to
encourage compliance with psychiatric advance directives.
CONCLUSION: REFORMING PSYCHIATRIC ADVANCE DIRECTIVE
STATUTES TO BENEFIT INDIVIDUALS LIKE JANE
A legal framework for psychiatric advance directives is growing
and evolving. Washington State, in particular, has a well-developed
statute that directly addresses the critical issues facing individuals
170. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-611 (1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:232 (2001);
MINN. STAT. § 253B.03 (6) (d) (1991).
171. IND. CODE § 16-36-1.7-4 (2004).
172. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.32.170(2) (2003).
173. See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 43/55 (1995) (providing immunity for the determi-
nation of capability or incapability to revoke and the administration or failure to administer
treatment in reliance upon the agent's decision or the validity of the directive); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7B-1 I (West 2006) (providing immunity for complying with a directive, assuming
the validity of a directive, and making use of permitted overrides, as well as complying or
declining to comply with an agent's decision based on the agent's apparent authority or lack
thereof); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-75 (1997) (granting immunity for the determination of
capability or incapability, the absence of knowledge of revocation, and the administration or
failure to administer treatment in reliance upon the validity of the directive).
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like Jane, who wish to bind themselves to treatment in advance and
avoid the devastation that often accompanies acute episodes of
their illnesses. The process that Washington followed in drafting its
statute provides one explanation for its comprehensiveness and
sensitivity: the statute was the result of a two-year collaboration be-
tween mental health consumers, mental health service providers,
attorneys, and legislators.
7 4
Born of multiple perspectives, the Washington statute combines
elements that are especially important in treatment-election sce-
narios. Preeminently, the statute offers flexibility, enabling Jane to
define when her directive becomes active and to choose whether
her directive will be revocable during incapacity. Thus, each indi-
vidual can craft a personalized plan for her unique situation. In
addition, the statute gives Jane the authority to consent to intrusive
mental health treatment, including hospitalization and medica-
tions that have worked for her in the past, and authorizes providers
to administer the treatment over her objections if certain condi-
tions are met. Also important in Jane's situation is her ability to
make the directive truly binding so that she cannot change her
mind while in the throes of mania.
By simultaneously providing flexibility and stability, the Washing-
ton statute recognizes that individuals with mental illnesses are
capable of making their own treatment decisions and offers a
mechanism for these individuals to retain control even when they
are incapacitated. Other states should consider adopting similar
statutory provisions that address the needs of individuals, like Jane,
who wish to take responsibility for their illnesses and remain
healthy, productive members of society.
174. Anderson, supra note 28, at 803.
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